God, Yoga and Karate: Local amenities and pathways to diversity

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Abstract:

This article explores how local organizations and amenities create “scenes,” which in turn correlate with neighborhood racial and socioeconomic diversity. We stress two key variables: internal, organizational authority and external framing. Organizations that combine high levels of internal authority with “outsider,” neutral framing create scenes associated with a broad range of socioeconomic groups. In the USA, many new-line, conservative Protestant churches (“new-cons”) combine biblical-based authority and racially neutral framing, and appeal to less-educated whites, blacks and Hispanics. However, scenes strongly framed as biblical-religious show less appeal among more-educated whites, who prefer individual-expressive scenes, such as embodied by art galleries and yoga. Finally, scenes framed as neither biblical nor expressive, but as broadly pop-culture and utilitarian, bridge across both racial and religious divides. For example, martial arts schools uniquely combine Confucian-based authority and neutral, outsider framing, and proliferate in all kinds of neighborhoods. Supportive evidence comes from multivariate analysis of a national dataset of local organizations.

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Introduction

Fueled by domestic and international migrations, American cities are growing increasingly diverse beyond black and white, to include substantial Hispanic and Asian populations. Local residents and neighborhoods follow different pathways to diversity. One outcome is stable, “global” neighborhoods, with a balanced mix of races and socioeconomic groups. Another is predominantly black and Hispanic, lower-income “minority zones,” “where whites are unlikely ever to venture” (Logan & Zhang 2010). Why do some neighborhoods follow one pathway rather than another? This article suggests one crucial component of an answer: local organizations and amenities create “scenes” (Silver, Clark, and Navarro 2010) that in turn influence neighborhood diversity.

Our argument has four components. First, we argue that some organizational types support practices that are more likely to bridge societal cleavages than are others. Specifically, organizations that exercise strong authority over members internally and are framed as outside current socio-cultural divides potentially appeal to a wider range of groups than alternatives do. By contrast, less-authoritarian organizations and those framed as part of societal cleavages have less bridging potential.

Second, we apply this general framework to the contemporary situation in the USA, locating its post-1960s religious-cultural divide along our two key variables, internal authority and outsider framing. The growing category of new-line, conservative Protestant churches (e.g. Pentecostal, non-denominational, Jehovah’s Witnesses) combine high levels of biblical-based authority and relatively outsider, racially neutral framing. Consequently, they attract more persons of all races than conservative-establishment (e.g. Southern Baptists) or progressive churches (e.g. Episcopal) (Yi 2009; Yi and Graziul 2011).

At the same time, since the 1960s, a growing number of Americans have shifted from traditional, biblical religion to more expressive activities, such as artistic and environmental groups. The most explicit alternative to traditional Christianity comes from versions of new age spirituality (e.g. yoga, meditation, “metaphysics”) (Heelas 2006), which draw eclectically on numerous traditions to develop non-dogmatic, individualized “spirituality.” However, partly because these groups are hesitant to direct internal, especially hierarchical, authority toward outreach efforts, and partly because they are seen as opposed to biblical-Christian tradition, their membership has remained mostly confined to better-educated whites.

Third, we argue that in the contemporary American context the institutions most likely to bridge this divide are those framed as neither biblical nor expressive, but instead as broadly pop-cultural (Lizardo 2006, Erickson 1996, Zelizer 1999). We distinguish two forms of popular culture, “low pop,” which includes sports, big box stores, pop music, and fast food, and “high pop,” with the latter having the strongest bridging potential. An example of high pop is martial arts schools. Although mostly derived from aristocratic Asian traditions, martial arts have avoided the taint of new age spirituality and appeal to Christians and non-Christians alike. With the help of Hollywood (e.g. Karate Kid) and other mainstream institutions, they have also become part of the broader, accessible popular culture.

Fourth, we connect these broad cultural themes to concrete places via the notion of “scenes”: the specific style of life promoted by a place, which can be attractive to
some and alien to others (Silver, Clark, and Navarro 2010). Our theory suggests that scenes embodying biblical, expressivist, or popular culture should create spaces more or less hospitable to different groups. Using a Yellow Pages-based national dataset of local organizations, which contains nearly 2 million instances of some 375 types of organizations, we develop measures of how strongly any given US zip code promotes various Biblical-Christian, Expressivist, and Pop Cultural scenes. We use these measures to test our theories by investigating how strongly each scene is associated with different racial, educational, and political variables. Results broadly confirm our hypotheses: places with strong New Conservative Christian scenes have more black and Hispanic residents but fewer highly educated whites; places with strong New Age scenes have more highly-educated whites but few lower-educated non-whites. By contrast, pop culture scenes are popular with all races and education levels, and places with more martial arts clubs in particular show the strongest growth in residents across race and education.

The character of the local cultural scene in other words provides a crucial element in understanding how and why some neighborhoods become “global” and others do not. It also directs our attention to types of activities with potentially crucial import for sustaining democratic society. Americans increasingly segregate themselves residually by taste and politics and decreasingly interact on a day-to-day basis with those whose attitudes and sensibilities differ from their own (Bishop 2008). Our arguments and results suggest that despite this trend, amenities like martial arts are widely popular and demand high levels of commitment and interaction from practitioners. They provide spaces where people from across societal cleavages can find common pleasures and opportunities to take into account the other as more than an abstraction or stereotype. Understanding the democratic potential of such organizations and the scenes they create is crucial to developing what we call a “many-stranded” theory of democracy, where democratic societies benefit from various types of organizations, egalitarian and authoritative alike.

“MANY-STRANDED” THEORY
Authority and Outsider

Few-stranded and many-stranded theories of democracy. Theorists have long debated the sorts of institutions conducive to liberal democracy. In one perspective, what we call “few-stranded,” only a few institutional types, i.e., internally egalitarian and democratic, nurture the moral dispositions (civic virtues) conducive to democratic politics. In horizontal, membership-based associations, such as student clubs, neighborhood associations, and some mainline Protestant and Jewish congregations, members meet as equals, undertake collective projects, and learn the habits of democratic citizenship. In contrast, authoritarian, hierarchical institutions that stress obedience and sacrifice to defined, external authorities, such as the army, corporate workplace, or the Catholic Church, are either irrelevant or antithetical to democratic virtues. Michael Walzer (1991) states, “Only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state.”

1 In a classic study, Robert Putnam (1993) finds that membership in the hierarchical Italian Catholic Church is negatively correlated with participation in the larger, democratic civic arena. Putnam makes a causal connection between horizontal associations and civic engagement in Northern Italy, and the vertical patron-
In another perspective, what we term “many-stranded,” liberal democracy fosters and benefits from many types of institutions, including authoritarian ones. “Authority” in this context refers to obedience to a set of rules, principles and persons, which can derive from various sources (e.g. Weberian tradition, legal-rationalism, or charismatic leadership). More-authoritarian organizations expect greater uniform adherence among members; less-authoritarian provide more leeway for individual interpretation and action.

In the United States, disciplined Protestant sects (e.g. Baptists, Methodists, Quakers) historically fostered a series of social virtues, such as honesty, reliability, cooperativeness, and duty to others (see Weber 1991a, Fukuyama 1995: 46; Taylor 2007: 423-472). These mores and habits in turn diffused to the rest of civil society. As described by Wuthnow, a member would stay involved in Rotary, a secular association, for decades “as a way of fulfilling his responsibilities as a Christian citizen” (Wuthow 1999: 359). Fukuyama argues, “democracy and capitalism work best when they are leavened with cultural traditions that arise from nonliberal sources” (Fukyuama 1995: 351).²

A multiple spheres model of participation. We build on these perspectives with three interrelated claims. First, members of some organizations join high levels of internal authority and external engagement within a pluralistic, individualistic society. They follow the multiple spheres model of participation that Alexis de Tocqueville observed among American Catholics more than a century ago. Catholics participated in two distinct spheres, one for church doctrine, i.e., “revealed dogmas to which [laity] submit without discussion,” the other for secular politics, “which they think God has left to man’s free investigation.” The result is that “American Catholics are both the most obedient of the faithful [within the church] and the most independent of citizens [without]” (Tocqueville 1969: 289).³

Seemingly opposite spheres reinforce one another. Second, seemingly opposite spheres potentially reinforce each other. The internal sphere of uniform dogma and rules provides a platform to unite members of diverse backgrounds. For Tocqueville, the authoritarian character of Catholic orthodoxy “mingles all classes of society at the foot of the same altar, just as they are mingled in the sight of God” (Tocqueville 1969: 288). Recently, large, fast-growing Protestant churches espouse bible-based authority and various hierarchical structures to integrate newcomers. The International Churches of

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³ According to Kraynak (2001), American Christians today share widespread agreement that “the form of government most compatible with the Christian religion is democracy” (p.1); they welcome “modern liberal democracy as a friend and an ally, even though they may criticize some of its features as misguided or downright immoral” (p. 167). Alan Wolfe (2003: 255) highlights the assimilation of religious believers into American middle-class culture: “Religious believers blend into the modern American landscape. They increasingly live in suburbs, send their children to four-year liberal colleges [and so forth.]. Tocqueville’s concept of distinct but linked spheres is analogous to that of functional differentiation, where individuals move across independent, interdependent units (see Parsons 1971)”
Christ coordinated an intensive bible study and "discipling" system, in which experienced members paired up with and mentored less experienced ones (Yi 2009). While some may consider one-on-one mentoring to be intrusive, it is also an effective mechanism to provide focused bible learning, daily structure, and deep personal relationships across racial and economic boundaries.

Similarly, many Asian-style martial arts promote explicit, Confucian doctrines and vertical senior-junior relations. Students are linked by a finely graded system of belts, from white to black to master, each with distinct status and obligations. In many cases, the hierarchical relations of the school extend beyond class hours, with students expected to bow and defer to higher-ranked practitioners even in informal meetings on the street or restaurants. The hierarchy of belts provides an effective mechanism to incorporate persons of different backgrounds. Outside of the neighborhood school, students participate in local, regional and national tournaments. The larger tournaments attract various ages, races, gender and educational backgrounds, and are among the few voluntary institutions where women (black belts) visibly exert authority over young men.

Building on Gorski (2003), we suggest that authoritarian settings that foster disciplined, purposive action unleash human energies, which can be channeled for individual or collective ends. Small, homogeneous organizations rely mostly on self- and mutual-observation to foster discipline; large, heterogeneous organizations add hierarchical-observation from higher-level leaders and members. The USA boasts a wide variety of disciplined, purposeful organizations, including some parochial and charter schools (e.g. KIPP), business corporations (e.g. Wal-Mart), old urban party machines and labor unions, and the US Marines.

Some authoritarian organizations instill key social virtues and connect persons of diverse backgrounds, both of which assist their members’ participation in the larger society. Conversely, pragmatic leaders recognize that participation in the larger society is essential to the organization’s long-term growth and viability. Groups that recruit new, heterogeneous members are more likely to boast committed practitioners than are insular groups. New converts often show more enthusiasm than the offspring of old members and reinforce overall participation.

**Frame effects.** For many organizations, what appear to be opposites—internal, hierarchical authority and external engagement; bonding and bridging social capital—actually reinforce each other. However, this is not always or primarily the case. Local context and external framing is critical, our third claim. “External framing” refers to how influential external actors (e.g. the mass media) frame a particular organization with respect to prevailing societal cleavages. The term “frame” denotes “schemas of interpretation” or cognitive structures that shape how individuals define reality (Goffman 1974: 21). More-neutral, “outsider” organizations are viewed as transcending prevailing

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4 See Gorski’s (2003) discussion of Calvinist institutions in northern Europe: “the technology of observation—self-observation, mutual-observation, hierarchical observation…made it possible to unleash the energies of the human soul” (xvi).

5 Historic example of disciplined, purposeful organizations in Europe and East Asia include the socialist and communist parties and labor unions

6 Social movements “will succeed to the extent that they sustain strong internal attachments, while remaining an open social network, able to maintain and form close ties to outsiders”. Insular movements, by contrast, decline and “implode socially” over time. (Stark and Iannaccone 1997: 152).  

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societal cleavages; less-neutral, establishment ones are more associated with such divisions.

Depending on how their relationship with prevailing societal cleavages is framed, more-authoritarian organizations can be a positive or negative force for external engagement. In a divided society, relatively new or outsider actors can bring together groups that rarely communicate in established, domestic settings. Nondenominational (e.g. Willowcreek) and historically marginal churches (e.g. Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses) are less associated with the racially segregated, Protestant establishment; they actively portray themselves, and are often framed by others as, racially neutral and transcend the bitter “animosities” (Tocqueville 1969: 450) of societal—indeed, racial-cleavages.

Organizations that are part of the old establishment in one social setting can become like “new” again in another. A new, “frontier” environment allows individuals and groups to leave behind historic sentiments and patterns, to experiment with new combinations, and consequently to remake themselves and their surroundings.\(^7\) Analogous to Catholicism in old Europe, Confucian traditions are often rejected by liberal reformers in East Asia as part of the biased, patriarchal past. In the USA, Confucian ethics (“traditional” Asian values) are frequently reinterpreted by martial arts practitioners as a dynamic tradition that is open to all, including women and racial minorities. Since Asian-style martial arts are not historically associated with blacks or whites, they can bring together both races more easily than do Christian denominations. Martial arts also attract progressive whites, including Jewish and secular intellectuals, who desire a sense of moral community (for themselves or their children) but who would not enter a conservative religious organization.\(^8\)

To summarize, organizations that join high levels of internal authority (e.g. doctrinal obedience, senior-junior hierarchy) with neutral, “outsider” framing, such as some karate schools and non-denominational churches, are more likely to bridge societal cleavages than are organizations without such combinations. We term this the “outsider-authoritarian” or, to borrow from Rousseau’s alien lawgiver (1978), the “alien hierarchy” proposition.

*Alien Hierarchy Proposition: Organizations that combine high levels of internal authority with neutral, “outsider” framing are more likely to bridge societal cleavages than are organizations without such combinations.*

**Organizational Amenities and American Traditions**

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\(^7\) These arguments draw on the frontier thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner (1893) (“The Significance of the Frontier in American History”), Daniel Elazar’s (1994) theory of the continuing frontier (“Frontiers and Foundings,” in chapter 4 of *The American Mosaic*), and the “alien lawgiver” concept of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (*Social Contract*). The latter refers to an alien legislator, whose very outsiderness places him above the messy disputes internal to a society and allows a new set of rules acceptable to all; also see Bonnie Honig (2003: 18).

\(^8\) An anecdote from one author: At a gathering of my extended (Jewish) family, a cousin announced, with more than one holocaust survivor in earshot, that his 9 and 11 year old sons would not have Bar Mitzvahs but would instead study martial arts because the latter provided stronger “ethical life-training” more relevant to his sons’ lives.
We apply our theoretical framework to the analysis of amenities in the USA. Building on a growing literature on culture and place (summarized in Kaufman and Kaliner 2011), we conceptualize distinct clusters of organizational amenities as “scenes,” or the specific cultural character of a locality, which in turn influence residential patterns (Silver, Clark, and Navarro 2010, Clark 2003). Many local scenes express in varying degrees core American cultural traditions. Drawing on Bellah et al, we analyze contemporary American scenes that embody three key traditions: 1) Biblical-Christian, 2) Expressivist, and 3) Utilitarian and Popular. We divide each into sub-categories to better capture our key variables, authority and framing. Thus, dividing New Conservative and Mainline churches highlights places with more-authoritative and outsider, versus mainline establishment, elements of the Biblical-Christian tradition. Similarly, we divide both the expressivist and utilitarian-popular traditions into “high” and “low” versions, where “low” (e.g. pottery classes, big-box stores) are more broadly accessible and “high” (New Age, Martial Arts) are based more in codified principles and are more personally demanding of participants.

Going beyond other studies that analyze one or a handful of amenities often across only a few cases, we use our national database of local amenities (described below) to measure each of these traditions as local scenes and to assess their relationship to racial and educational divisions. Table 1 shows the amenities we use to measure how strongly each tradition defines the scene for every US zip code. Below, we outline their key analytical characteristics. We then use our general theoretical framework to generate hypotheses about how scenes embodying each tradition should appeal to different groups, some resonating with a wide range of tastes and drawing persons from diverse backgrounds, others reflecting and reinforcing societal divides. We test these hypotheses using multiple regression analyses that control for a host of other variables.

### Table 1: American Cultural Traditions as Local Scenes

**Biblical, Expressivist, and Utilitarian Traditions.** For Tocqueville, the dominant American tradition is egalitarianism and individualism. In the USA, a general equality of

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9. As Molotch (2011: 157) puts it, this stream of research recognizes a link between “migration and soul.”
10. In factor analysis, Jehovah’s Witnesses correlated with New-Con; however, because of some controversy whether it theoretically belongs in this category, we decided to exclude it. The New-Con scene basically includes “Evangelical Protestants” as defined by Steensland et al (2000), minus the established denominational churches (e.g. Southern Baptists, Lutherans). We separate Catholic churches because of their special role in American urban life and comment on results mostly in footnotes. “Baptist” includes mainline (mostly northern) Baptists, evangelical Southern Baptists, and Black Baptist churches, so we do not include it in either Mainline or New Conservative but analyze it separately.
11. In using amenities as indicators of local style of life we are building on and sharpening recent work in urban and community sociology. Clark (2003) for instance analyzes the differential impacts of built amenities (like operas and juice bars) and natural amenities (like lakes and weather) on migration patterns by age groups; Silver, Clark, and Navarro (2010) use amenities to make indexes of the symbolic meanings expressed in places, such as transgression, glamour, or local authenticity; Kaufman and Kaliner measure the cultural differences between socio-economically similar Vermont and New Hampshire with amenities like Dairy Queen and Ben and Jerry’s; Papachristos et al. (2011) show that coffee shops are strongly tied to declines in homicide rates in gentrifying Chicago neighborhoods between 1991 and 2005; among others. We add especially to the latter by showing how if coffee shops draw gentrifying middle-class whites, other collections of amenities foster qualities attractive to multiple groups, holding constant a place’s socio-economic characteristics.
conditions and an open, fluid social structure foster an individualist ethos, at least among the free, white male population. Tocqueville used the term “individualism” to describe the particular way in which people “turned in on themselves” all of their feelings and beliefs.

Bellah and colleagues, in turn, highlight two different dimensions of individualism. One is utilitarian, focused on concrete, material gains. Exemplified by upwardly mobile entrepreneurs (e.g. Benjamin Franklin, Dale Carnegie), the individualist utilitarian often sacrifices short-term pleasures for long-term, economic gains (Bellah et al 1996: 32-33). In contrast, the expressive dimension valorizes the autonomy of individuals to realize and express their own identities and values; it critiques external constraints and rules, such as that in the corporate or state bureaucracy, and resonates among creative, iconoclastic intellectuals (e.g. Walt Whitman, Ralph Waldo Emerson, the fictional Benjamin Braddock).

For Tocqueville (and Bellah), the increasing isolation of individuals from one another breeds a sense of personal insignificance and corrodes healthy civic democracy. A society of isolated individuals potentially becomes dependent on, and dominated by, a paternalistic and intrusive State, such as the one Tocqueville saw in his native France. Fortunately, American individualism was historically moderated by a complex matrix of government and civil society. In particular, Christian churches and civic federations, which respectively embodied biblical and republican traditions, connected and educated individuals to serve higher, collective purposes (Bellah et al 1996; Skocpol 1999).

Since the 1960s, a complex set of factors, including an unpopular war (Vietnam), influenced significant numbers of the educated professional middle-class to reject the historic WASP establishment. The “counterculture” turned to and expanded the expressive tradition from William James to Abraham Maslow, in the form of a spirituality grounded in the primacy of individual experience and enlightenment (Bender 2010). New-Age scenes combine an eclectic mix of traditions, such as Zen Buddhism, Hindu Yoga, meditation, and metaphysics, often reinterpreting their authoritarian elements to fit with a passivist non-coercive orientation and a non-dogmatic “religion of no religion,” while rejecting what could not fit this frame (Kripal 2007: 365). They oppose big, hierarchical institutions such as the state and corporation, in favor of small groups of individuals oriented toward personal development. At the same time, they join with some medical, artistic, and religious organizations, combining new age spirituality.

12 “As social equality spreads, there are more and more people who, though neither rich nor powerful enough to have much hold over others, have gained or kept enough wealth and enough understanding to look after their own needs. Such folk owe no man anything and hardly expect anything from anybody. They form the habit of thinking for and of themselves in isolation, and imagine that their whole destiny is in their hands.”

13 “Individualism is a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends; with this little society formed to his task, he gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself.” (Tocqueville 1969: 506).

14 See also Parsons (1978) on religion in post-industrial American and what he terms “the expressive revolution.”

15 Their otherworldly orientation is evident in the slogan “tune in, turn on, drop out,” as well as in the location of key institutions far away from urban centers, in Sedona, New Mexico or along the Big Sur coast at the Esalen Institute (where Maslow was a regular visitor), or in college towns like Boulder, CO or Cambridge MA.
with alternative healing, aesthetic creativity, and some mainline and non-denominational churches that include more meditative elements (Bender 2010).

Still, new age groups are often highly demanding, representing a rigorous, self-conscious form of individual expressivism. Many yoga and metaphysical groups expect hours of weekly and even daily practices from their members and cultivate devotion to the doctrines of experienced teachers. For instance, students of Anusara Yoga, one of the fastest growing styles in North America, move through discrete levels as they work their way up a highly codified curriculum. Teachers operating in studios around the world advance through a centrally coordinated series of exams, which test their physical and pedagogical abilities as well as their understanding of spiritual doctrine. Each class begins with an invocation and is organized around a principle, such as “brightness.” Students learn that yoga is a life practice in which “the purpose of the practice is the practice.”

In more mild fashion, the expressive tradition informs scenes with a wide variety of amenities popular among college-educated whites (e.g. David Brooks’ “Bobos”), including art galleries, cafes, health food stores, and environmental organizations. Silver and Clark (2011) document the rise of such amenities in many urban centers, and their mix of “self-expression” and “tolerance” has been a key pillar of Richard Florida’s theory of the creative class, which posits a growing divergence between tolerant, creative, high-tech cities and regions (e.g. San Francisco) and religiously conservative, economically isolated hinterlands (e.g. Kansas). Expressive also describes the recent phenomenon of “emerging churches”: small, loosely organized, spiritual groupings, such as Bluer in Minneapolis, which eschew the doctrinal certainty and organizational hierarchy of large denominations. They follow a “postmodern,” nonjudgmental approach of dialogue among multiple views (Bishop 2008: 277).

Expressivist scenes promote a general reluctance to impose hierarchical authority or rules that may violate individual autonomy. They also support the tenets of multiculturalism, which extends the freedom of expression from individuals to ethno-racial groups and rejects the “melting pot” model of assimilation. However, a genuine commitment to ideals of diversity and inclusion is often coupled with racial and socioeconomic homogeneity, especially among new age groups.

**Constraints on the Bridging Potential of Expressivist and Biblical Traditions.**

Using our theoretical framework, we suggest that the bridging potential of expressivist scenes are hampered by the relative absence of authoritative mechanisms to actively recruit diverse new members. High-expressive (new age) groups are generally more demanding, centrally organized, doctrinally-oriented, and authoritative, than low-expressive ones (e.g. art classes); however, many new-age leaders focus the energies of

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16 Kripal (2007) notes that Esalen had to scale back its operations in San Francisco as churches began to offer meditation and yoga.

17 Still, they often are reluctant to trace authority to specific persons. Thus, early American practitioners in New Age settings such as the Esalen Institute struggled to combine the strict, often masculine authority of the yogi with their own commitment to personal expression and development. As the practice spread, it focused to a larger degree than martial arts on personal inwardness rather than competition and hierarchy. Similarly, Anusara Yoga, though tightly organized around its founder (John Friend), interprets the guru principle as an impersonal light that shines through some individuals rather than an obligation to obey a specific master. The legacy of these differences appear in our empirical results, below. More generally, though all three hail from Asia, yoga, Buddhism and martial arts became appropriated into distinct
their followers on cultivating meditative tranquility, personal development, and releasing themselves into higher spiritual planes rather than actively and practically engaging external others – in Weberian terms they tend toward a “passive-otherworldy” orientation. In Bender’s (2010) account of mostly white, highly educated “new metaphysicals” in Cambridge, MA, practitioners imagine themselves spiritually interacting with people in strife-torn countries, such as Iraq. Bender describes this exercise as a kind of “spiritual imperialism,” as upper-status Americans project themselves into a realm of “peace and justice” where they “travel quickly and effortlessly to other parts of the world and lift up…women and children from the lock of spiritual and political tyranny” (Bender 2010: 180).

Many new-age leaders exhort their members to cultivate better selves, but feel constrained from “ordering” them to invite diverse newcomers or to do outreach in strange neighborhoods. They emerged as a counter to mainstream norms and sought, in Weberian mode, to reject the world and to establish a higher standpoint. However, in distancing themselves from mainstream traditions, and specifically organized Christian religion, they open rifts with central and enduring strands of American culture. Accordingly, they also lack a neutral framing among many Americans. In the post-1960s cultural divide, many religious and social conservatives feel distant from artists, environmentalists and other “hippie” types. In particular, new age groups are framed as incompatible with traditional Christianity, the religion of most nonwhites.18

Another influential trend has been the rapid, global growth of new or historically marginal (“new-line”) strains of conservative Protestantism, including the Jehovah’s Witnesses, LDS/Mormons, Pentecostal, and non-denominational churches (e.g. Willowcreek, Saddleback). These new-line conservatives (“new-cons”) are more-authoritarian, inner-worldly activists and have little qualms about pushing their members to invite diverse newcomers. They often establish branches in inner city neighborhoods and actively recruit members. The campaign to create truly multiethnic, authentic Christian communities is only the latest manifestation of the American biblical tradition, which has promoted the sacred “Body of Christ” community since the early Puritans and their “City on a Hill.”

On the other hand, framed as conservative Christians, new-con groups hit a wall when reaching out to the expressivist, and especially new-age, constituency of college-educated whites. New age and new-con groups thus represent two divergent responses to the perceived shortcomings of the traditional, Judeo-Christian establishment in the twentieth century. Empirical studies (e.g. Yi 2009, Putnam and Campbell 2010), including our own below, suggest that new-con churches actively recruit all races, but remain far more popular among nonwhites and non-college graduates. New-age groups value universal openness, but empirically are few in number and socially homogeneous (i.e., mostly college-educated whites, as in both Bender and Kripal’s studies). In summary, new-con and new-age groups, like (holy) water and (body) oil, tend not to mix.

Subcultures in the USA: Yoga and Buddhism into expressive, heavily feminine subculture; and martial arts into initially masculine and military, and then into more family oriented pop culture. For historical narrative of yoga and Buddhism see Bender 2010; Yi 2009, chapter 7 for martial arts; See Kripal 2007 for an account of yoga in Esalen.

18 In 2003, the Vatican and the Southern Baptists leadership flatly rejected new age beliefs (Stammer 2003). Attempts to combine yoga with Christianity, such as “Christian Yoga,” also elicited controversy (Alter 2003)
The divide is problematic from the perspective of national integration and equality, because new age groups are overrepresented among the most-educated, high-income communities (e.g. Lincoln Park, Ann Arbor) and new cons in the working-class, minority and immigrant neighborhoods (e.g. Chicago’s Southside, East L.A.).

The Bridging Potential of Popular Culture is Less Constrained. Organizations framed as neither biblical nor expressive are potentially more likely to contribute to scenes that bridge the post-1960s cultural divide. In the contemporary context, this means that pop-culture and utilitarian scenes may hold the most bridging potential. Pop culture collectively synthesizes and markets elements from many traditions for broad audiences (cf. Zelizer 2009). Big-box stores sell nearly anything for profit, including devotional books and organic foods, Jesus candles and yoga mats. Fast food restaurants offer all types of “ethnic” and hybrid foods, including Korean Tacos. Music and sports showcase both the profane/scandalous (e.g. Eminem, Michael Vick) and the profound/sacred (e.g. Santana, Pat Tillman).

If Christian and expressivist scenes embody Bellah et al.’s biblical and expressivist traditions, respectively, then we suggest that pop culture scenes are most closely associated with the utilitarian and pragmatic traditions. For some scholars (e.g. Lizardo 2006), the commercial, profit-orientation leads to lowest-common denominator low-brow culture and broad but weak ties. People of all races, especially the less-educated, patronize big box stores and big-time sports, but what they gain is superficial and their social interactions are shallow. More-educated people prefer the high-brow culture associated with classic music, ballet, and museums; they eschew big-time sports in favor of personalized yoga.

We revise and broaden the concept of pop culture by highlighting organizational types, what we call “high pop,” that synthesize the accessibility and bridging aspects of pop-culture with the “higher” moral and aesthetic values of highbrow culture. Scenes with high numbers of high-pop organizations tap into a moralistic version of utilitarianism that focuses on “moral self-discipline and self-help, not primarily on extrinsic rewards” (Bellah et al 1996: x). A key indicator is martial arts. With ubiquitous classes in the local YMCA, park districts and public schools, martial arts have become part of the broad, accessible popular culture, from Appalachia to Arizona, Birmingham to the Bronx. As a disciplined, authoritarian institution, martial arts also show greater appeal to whole families than “superficial,” low-pop activities, such as fantasy sports. Unlike New-Con and New-Age, martial arts benefit from a unique synthesis of hierarchical authority and outsider framing in post-1960s America. “God” and Yoga practitioners alike are welcome and often found in the karate dojo.

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19 One of Zelizer’s (1999) key insights that we build on here is that popular culture contains both bridging and bonding elements, as in her examples of early 20th century Italian families gathering around the radio.

20 Another personal anecdote from on this point. As a graduate student in Chicago, I was a student in the University Hwaramdo Club, one of the more hierarchical Korean styles. Each class would end with a chant (in Korean and English) expressing loyalty to family, teacher, and country; students would be expected to refer to higher belts as “sir” inside and outside of class, regardless of age or undergraduate/graduate student status. We were also required to participate in recruiting efforts – behavior very unusual for “free thinking” and ironic graduate students. Visits to the regional Master in suburban Madison, WI were required for promotional exams, during which time students would have to, for instance, explain what “loyalty to my country” means to the group. During the mid-2000s, for especially the Wisconsin students, this would often mean “doing what the President says,” while for the graduate students
In summary, new-con churches combine outreach-oriented, authoritarian organizations and racially neutral framing. They are more likely to link to scenes that bridge racial divisions than are other Christian or expressive groups. However, they have difficulties building bridges across the post-1960s, religio-cultural divide. In contrast, pop culture groups, especially martial arts, link to scenes that bridge both racial and religious divides.

Table 2: American Traditions in a Divided Society

Table 2 summarizes the above discussion by locating scenes informed by these core American cultural traditions within contemporary social divisions. The table stresses again aspects of our two key variables, framing and the extent to which authority is exercised to encourage external outreach to diverse populations. We highlight in bold the three scenes most central to our discussion: New Con, New Age, and High Pop, i.e., God, Yoga, and Karate. New Con stands relatively outside established racial divides but relatively inside established religio-cultural divides (between Biblical religion and spirituality), while actively requiring members to engage in regular, sometimes daily, outreach. New Age scenes are more likely within established racial and religious cleavages and less likely to promote external engagement, encouraging instead inward personal development. High Pop (martial arts) scenes are in the middle, authority-wise: they are less proselytizing than New Con but more externally engaged than New Age. Moreover, they are relative outsiders to contemporary American racial and cultural divides.

Local Contexts. Finally, we stress that general claims are mediated by local contexts. The framing of particular scenes is influenced by the neighborhood racial and economic composition. For instance, we hypothesize that in lower-income, non-white (predominantly black and Hispanic) areas (e.g. Columbia Heights, Washington DC), many residents may view a rapid rise in New Age amenities (e.g. yoga studios) as part of an “intruding scene” portending white-led gentrification, which in low-income black

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21 In Yi (2009), students in the Tang Soo Do school faithfully obeyed the master’s request to perform and advertise their school at various community and university events; still, these events occurred infrequently (6-8 times a year), mostly during the summer and fall months. In contrast, the leaders at the Chicago Church of Christ exhorted their members to outreach and invite newcomers on a daily basis, and organized weekly and monthly events (e.g. dinners, dances, picnics, community service) to do so.

22 The table also highlights the relatively ambiguous and perhaps transitional character of low expressive scenes. Art classes for instance can be part of arts activism, led by committed leaders who use the arts to engage with and bring together diverse, often youth, populations, black and white, who might not otherwise interact (like Alternate Roots in the Southern US, an organization in which members are required to put art in the service of social justice); they can also be pottery classes or galleries where like-minded individuals gather with others like themselves and teachers would not consider “imposing” their morality on students. Finally, although direct selling organizations (e.g. Mary Kay Cosmetics) are not included in our yellow pages database, we include them as theoretically interesting, potential examples of organizations outside the racial and religio-cultural divide that use their authority to direct members outward (see Biggart 1989, Yi 2009).
residents are replaced by white, college graduates. In this context, new age is associated with a zero-sum sensibility pitting high-status whites against lower-status minorities.

In higher-income, predominantly white areas (e.g. Madison, CT), however, New Age scenes may be less associated with elitism, but with more openness to new ideas and cultures. New age amenities thus in these contexts might link with more positive sum sensibilities and with a “global neighborhood” pathway, in which all-white neighborhoods diversify with rising Asians, Hispanics and, eventually, blacks (see Logan & Zhang 2010).

RESEARCH DESIGN

We operationalize our theory and assess key propositions using our Yellow Pages-based national dataset of local organizations, which contains nearly 2 million instances of 375 types of organizations for all US ZIP codes (Silver, Clark, and Navarro 2010; Silver, Clark, and Graziul 2011, and Silver 2011 demonstrate the validity and analytical utility of this database). Summaries of variables employed in our analyses are included in the appendix. To measure American cultural traditions as local scenes, we made additive indexes of amenities (summarized in Table 1 above) that represent our theoretically important scenes and used factor analysis to confirm that they reasonably cluster together.

From our general theory, we expect a particular scene to be associated with certain neighborhood demographics and trends. We do not necessarily make strong claims about causal direction, i.e., whether the scene leads to demographic trends or demographic trends fosters particular scenes. They likely both occur around the same time and reinforce one another. We simply argue that our measures index local cultural characteristics with a reasonable degree of reliability and investigate whether their social correlates are consistent with our theoretical propositions. Other work (e.g. Silver, Clark, and Graziul 2011) has shown that similar indexes are relatively stable over time. The face-validity of our indexes emerges in the course of analysis.

We test the following specific predictions derived from our more general hypotheses:

A. Cultural divide: New Con vs. New Age:

1. New Con scenes should be more numerous and more popular with blacks, Hispanics, and non-college graduates.
2. New Age scenes should be fewer in number, more concentrated, and more popular with whites and college grads.

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23 PageRaptor software was used to download the categories in 2005-2006 from yellowpages.com; socio-economic changes are from the US Census and cover changes from 1990-2000. The yellow pages database includes a total of 1,985,540 amenities, about 47 per zip code, and 377 different categories of amenity. Many zip codes have no amenities; of those that have any, most have just one kind of amenity, with an average of 22 different kinds and a median of 10. Though the kind of amenities present does change year-over-year, analysis of similar composite measures based on census data showed a less than 1% total change in any scene measure based on the overall local set of amenities, from 1998 to 2004. This was despite an increase in the total number of amenities of interest of over 7%. Still, change in local amenity composition over time is a strategic site for further research in this area, in the mode of Papachristos et al. (2011).
3. New Con and New Age scenes should be the most negatively correlated (among all scenes); their location should reflect the Red/Blue divide, with New Age more in the West and Northeast and New Con more in the South and Midwest.
4. Both New Con and New Age scenes should show zero-sum dynamics; in such scenes, as one group rises, others fall.
5. These divides should be less extreme for the less demanding versions of Biblical Christianity and Expressive Individualism, i.e., Mainline Christian and low-expressivism.

B. Pop Culture Bridging

1. Pop culture scenes should be numerous, normally distributed, mostly positive (or at least non-negative) correlations with other scenes.
2. Low-pop (e.g. big-box stores) should appeal broadly to many ethnic groups, both college and non-college graduates, as well as both Republicans and Democrats.
3. High pop (martial arts) should also appeal across ethnic and status divides, but should appeal to highly educated persons more than low pop does.
4. High pop (martial arts) are more likely to be located in “global neighborhoods” with mostly whites and smaller, but rising, clusters of Hispanics, Asians and blacks.
5. Both should show positive sum rather than zero-sum dynamics; that is, they should be more correlated with rising total numbers of many groups than rising percentages of specific groups.

C. Contextual Effects

Because of framing effects, the social correlates of different scenes should vary in different contexts.

1. In non-white areas, higher numbers of New Age amenities are framed as “intruders.” They should be associated with declining percent and total blacks and rising shares of white, college graduates.
2. In all-white areas, New Age scenes signal openness to non-traditional sensibilities. They should in these contexts be associated with rising ethnic diversity, especially, following Logan and Zhang, Hispanics and Asians.

ANALYSIS

To test our propositions, we first examine the number and distribution of our indexes, as in Table 3.

Table 3: New Con and Low Pop are the most numerous and broadly distributed; Expressivist are the fewest and most concentrated
New Con and Low Pop amenities are the most numerous, with about 2.5 per zip code and around 110,000 of each, nationally. High-expressive (New Age) are the least numerous, and low-expressive (e.g. art galleries) are the most concentrated (they have the highest kurtosis). As a group, the pop culture indexes have the most normal distribution of our groups of scenes, and low pop has the most normal of any particular scene (both new con and mainline show a fairly normal distribution as well). These results are all broadly consistent with our hypotheses.

Table 3 shows partial correlations of our scenes with one another, controlling for total amenities. We use partial correlations to account for the fact that any large concentration of organizations is likely to include a great variety of amenities of all types.

**Table 4: New Con and New Age do not mix; Pop Culture bridges many cultural divides**

New Age (high-expressive) scenes are indeed negatively correlated with new con scenes, as well as Baptist and Catholic churches. They are positively correlated with the low-expressive amenities. Low pop is positively correlated with all but one scene (New Age), and its average correlation coefficient across indexes is the highest. Martial arts (high pop) is the only scene to be positively correlated (greater than .1) with all others. These again are consistent with our hypotheses and demonstrate the bridging power of popular, and especially high pop (martial arts), culture.

To assess typical geographical locations of our scenes, we show in Figure 1 their average levels across US regions, using US census definitions of the Northeast, South, Midwest, and West.

**Figure 1: More Mainline and Baptists are in the South and Midwest; More Expressivist and Martial Arts organizations are in the West and Northeast; Low Pop amenities are high in all regions and New Con is weakest in the Northeast, strongest in the West.**

Baptist and Mainline show the most traditional “culture divide” distribution among the Christian scenes, with higher levels in the South and Midwest. New Con is also high in the South and Midwest, but its “frontier” aspect shows in its high levels in the West and its much lower numbers in the Northeast. Low pop is highest in the South and West, but has the most equal levels across regions. Martial arts in this regard is more like the expressive scenes: high in the Northeast and West and low in the South and Midwest. We note as well that many of the highest scoring individual zip codes fit theoretical expectations. The top New Con zip codes are in the rural south and in predominantly black and Hispanic areas of big cities (e.g. Chicago’s Cottage Grove Heights, and South Central Los Angeles); the top new age zip codes are in college towns.

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24 Their less negative association with Mainline is consistent with the case studies we cite above, which report that the mixing of yoga and meditation with traditional religious organizations has mostly occurred in mainline churches.
(Boulder, Ann Arbor, Santa Cruz) and "hippie enclaves" (Santa Fe), as well as more bobo neighborhoods like Lincoln Park, Chicago. Low-expressive is similar but more urban, with its highest scoring zip codes in downtown San Francisco and Manhattan, “indie” centers like Seattle, Portland, and Austin, as well as tech-knowledge centers, like Raleigh NC.

To assess our hypotheses about correlations between scenes embodying American cultural strands and ethnicity and educational status, we ran multiple regression models. In each model, we regress our indexes and a battery of control variables on a measure of local ethnic, educational, and political composition. Our controls include: total amenities, county population, zip code population, zip code density, median gross rent, % married, median age, % college graduates, county average school quality, and % of the county that voted for Bill Clinton in 1992.25 Together, these help us to take account of city and neighborhood size and density, education/status, cost of living, general political culture, family structure, and school quality – all classic variables that influence who moves and lives where and with whom. Results for scenes are thus all net of these controls.

Our dependent variables are levels and change in non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Levels are measured as percent of the total population; we analyze change both as change in percent (e.g. 15 to 18% Asian) and total change (e.g. 500 to 800 Asians), which allows us to trace both zero-sum and positive sum dynamics. We also analyze Democratic voting as a dependent variable, as well as a measure of overall zip code ethnic diversity, which is a racial entropy measure. We calculate racial entropy for 2000 and 1990 Census data, and analyze both 1990 diversity and the difference between 1990 and 2000.26 Racial entropy ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents complete racial homogeneity in a zip code, with the entire zip code population of a single race, and 1 represents maximal diversity, with a perfectly even distribution of individuals across the various racial categories.27 Wherever we analyze a change measure, we include the corresponding level as an independent variable. That is, if we analyze change in % white, we include level % white.

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25 Zip code level census data are from Geolytics, county from County Business Patterns; all levels are 1990 and all change are 1990 to 2000. Our measure of school quality is the county mean of Expansion Management’s Educational Quotient, which ranks 2800 school districts based mostly on college board (ACT, SAT) scores and graduation rates, as well as per-pupil spending, teacher-student ratio, and teacher salary, which are given less weight. We applied natural logarithms if a variable is highly skewed. We use the term “zip code” because of its familiarity, though technically we are analyzing US Census ZCTAs. More details on all variables can be found in the Appendix.

26 Census 2000 table P7 from Summary File 3 provides the population in 14 different racial categories. The 14 racial categories are: White, Black, Native American, Asian, Hawaiian, Other, Mixed, Hispanic White, Hispanic Black, Hispanic Native American, Hispanic Asian, Hispanic Hawaiian, Hispanic Other, Hispanic Mixed. Census 1990 table P012 from Summary Tape File 3 provides the population in 10 different racial categories. The 10 racial categories are: White, Black, Native American, Asian or Pacific Islander, Other, Hispanic White, Hispanic Black, Hispanic Native American, Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander, Hispanic Other.

27 We also calculated diversity according to the Simpson’s reciprocal diversity index, which measures the probability that two randomly chosen individuals are from different races. Higher values of the index thus represent greater racial diversity. For 2000, the Racial entropy measure and the Simpson’s reciprocal diversity index correlate to r=0.981. For 1990, the Racial entropy measure and the Simpson’s reciprocal diversity index correlate to r=0.979
Figures 2-4 summarize results for our three core theoretical pairs of more and less demanding scenes: New Con and Mainline; High Expressive (New Age) and Low Expressive; High Pop (Martial Arts) and Low Pop.\textsuperscript{28} These figures show standardized regression coefficients for each scene as an independent variable, regressed separately on 21 dependent variables, net of the controls summarized above.\textsuperscript{29} An “o” above a bar indicates a result that is not statistically significant at the p < .05 level. Though including so many independent variables in the same model raises concerns about multi-collinearity, with such large N’s, our results are robust across multiple specifications. VIF (Variance Inflation Factors) are all less than 5 and are typically under 3.

**Figure 2:** New Con scenes are ethically diverse, with many lower educated blacks and Hispanic residents.

**Figure 3:** New Age scenes are less and decreasingly diverse, more and increasingly white, more and increasingly educated.

**Figure 4:** Pop Culture scenes bridge many social divides and show positive sum dynamics.

As Figure 2 shows, places with more New Con churches tend to have growing total populations. They show overall and increasing ethnic diversity. They have the least whites of any of our indexes, and whites are declining as a share of total population. They have high and growing shares of Hispanics and especially blacks, while Asians are declining as a share of total population. They have few college graduates, and the college graduates proportion of the population is declining. That is, blacks and Hispanics are moving in, college graduates and Asians are moving out. New Con churches are typically located in Republican counties. Mainline Christian scenes are also in Republican areas, but they typically have more and rising college graduates and post-graduates and are less diverse overall. Though they have significant numbers of African-Americans, they have few Hispanics and Asians.

Places with more New Age amenities are almost polar opposites of New Con. The top 500 zip codes with the highest numbers of New Con churches averaged 46% white in 2000. By contrast, zip codes with at least 3 New Age amenities (roughly the top 500) averaged 76% white. The average US zip code is 82% white. When we add our controls as in Figure 3, the association with whites stands out more strongly. Accounting for education, cost of living, population density, etc., the populations of New-Age scenes are stagnant, less racially diverse, and not growing more diverse. They are white and getting whiter faster than places strong in any of our other scenes; they also have low and declining shares of blacks and Hispanics, low percentages of Asians, and the total number of blacks and Hispanics is contracting. At the same time, they show the strongest

\textsuperscript{28} Results for Catholic and Baptist can be found in the appendix, as can summaries of complete results for all variables included in our models. Baptist is generally similar to New Con, the biggest difference being that New Con have more Hispanics and Baptists more Asians. Catholic scenes are most strongly associated with Democratic Voting and Hispanics, have fewer Blacks and Asians, and tend to be less ethnically diverse overall.

\textsuperscript{29} For change in college graduates, we also controlled for % white.
positive association with college graduates of our cultural indexes, and college graduates as a share of the population are increasing most rapidly in New Age scenes, which also show strong growth in post-graduates. Places with more low expressive amenities are also highly and increasingly educated, but they are less exclusive, showing higher and increasing overall diversity, more Hispanics, and an insignificant relation to voting. However, they have fewer blacks and are losing both blacks and Asians.

Figure 4 suggests that Low Pop scenes are diverse and dynamic; their populations are rapidly growing and are diverse across many ethnicities, and this diversity is increasing (nearly as rapidly as in the case of New Con). They have high and increasing shares of Hispanics, and their percentages of Blacks and Asians are rising. Like New Con, Low Pop scenes are typically located in Republican Counties, in contrast to New Con, however, Low Pop scenes have high and increasing college graduate shares of the population. And in contrast to both New Con and New Age, Low Pop shows positive sum dynamics: though whites are declining as a share of the population, their total numbers are growing, as are Hispanics, Blacks, Asians, and College Graduates. This is strong empirical support for the bridging power of popular culture.

What about Martial Arts clubs? Places with more martial arts clubs (high pop) show no statistically significant association with level or change in overall ethnic diversity. Like New Age, they were more white in 1990, but in contrast to New Age since then the white share of the population has significantly declined while percent Asian has risen. They show the strongest increase in post-graduate share of the population of any of our indexes, and they are no more likely to be located in a Republican county than in a Democratic county. As in the case of Low Pop, High Pop (martial arts) culture shows positive sum dynamics: whites are declining as a share of population but rising overall; Hispanic, Black, and college graduate shares of the population are stable but their total numbers are all growing.

To assess our hypotheses about the connection between martial arts schools and global neighborhoods, we split our file into three groups, the first is less than 1% black, the 2nd 1-8% (average around 3.5%), and the third 8-100% (average 33%). Martial Arts schools are most likely to be found in our middle group of black zip codes, those with 1-8% black. This segment of the country averages 1.5 martial arts clubs per zip code, compared to .3 in places with less than 1% black population and .77 in places with more than 8% black population. Moreover, if we run our models in each of these groups, we find that in these neighborhoods, as Figure 5 shows, martial arts clubs are more strongly associated with rising shares of Hispanic and black population than they are elsewhere. That is, martial arts schools seem likely to be in more “global neighborhoods,” and their presence is correlated with rising ethnic diversity.30

Figure 5: Martial Arts are more strongly associated with rising shares of African Americans and Hispanics in zip codes with moderate levels of African American residents than in predominantly Black or non-Black neighborhoods.

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30 For example: In zip code 90807 in Long Beach, CA (pop. 27890 in 1990), black residents increased from 7 to 15% of the total population, Hispanics 10 to 17%, and Asians 9 to 14%; whites dropped from 74 to 48%, still the biggest group. It has 8 martial arts, 15 new con churches and 1 new age.
To evaluate our hypotheses about the effects of local context on new age scenes, we split our file into sub-groups, run our models within them, and compare differences across groups. Specifically, we created quintile groups of the white share of local population. These range from 0-77% white (average 50%) in the bottom group, 77-93% in the 2nd, 93-98% in the third, 98-99% in the fourth, and 99-100% in the fifth. Figure 6 shows results for New Age amenities across these five groups of zip codes.

**Figure 6**: In all-white neighborhoods (99-100%), New Age scenes have more hispanics, blacks, and Asians. In less-white neighborhoods with more new age amenities, non-whites are declining and college graduates are rising.

Nationally, places with more New Age amenities are highly likely to show strong declines, as we saw, in Blacks and Hispanics. Figure 5 shows that the connection between New Age scenes and decline in blacks is strongest in the neighborhoods with the fewest whites. At the same time, the rise in whites and college graduates is by far the strongest in these neighborhoods. Figure 5 also shows how New Age amenities operate differently in all-white contexts. As in the country’s least-white neighborhoods, in the most-white neighborhoods, they are associated with increasing ethnic diversity. Yet in this case diversity comes not from replacing blacks with whites but through gains in Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians. If an all-white neighborhood (99%) is getting less white, it is likely to have yoga studios and meditation centers; if a predominantly black neighborhood is gentrifying, it too is likely to have yoga studios and meditation centers. These results are consistent with our theorizing above.

### MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Empirical results are broadly consistent with our expectations. New Conservative and New Age movements do embody divergent and divided strands of American culture. The one appeals to ethnic minorities and less educated persons, the other to highly educated whites; the two rarely mix; where one appears, the other recedes.

Popular culture bridges cleavages of race and class. High pop culture, exemplified by martial arts, is distinctive first in being popular not only with mostly white, post-graduate degree holders, perhaps the least religious segment of the American populace (Sacerdote and Glaeser 2008), but also with Blacks and Hispanics, the most religious. Second, martial arts are prevalent in both Democratic and Republican counties. And third, they are associated with the strongest positive sum dynamics of any scene we

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31 To illustrate: zip code 06443 in Madison, CT (pop. 15485 in 1990) has 4 New Age amenities, 5 “low expressive” amenities compared to 4 Mainline and 1 New Con church. It went from 99 to 95% white between 1990 and 2000, with increases coming mostly from Asians and Hispanics. By contrast, 20009 in Washington DC (which includes the Capital Heights and Adams Morgan neighborhoods, pop. 46845) went from 44 to 30% black, with increases coming from whites, Hispanics and Asians. It has 8 New Age amenities and 13 low-expressive amenities compared to 8 Mainline and 5 New Con. 28801 in Asheville, NC (pop. 13, 598) similarly went from 51 to 43% black, with increases coming from whites, Hispanics and Asians. It has 6 New Age and 9 low-expressive amenities together with 24 New Con, 17 Mainline, 25 Baptist churches, 7 martial arts clubs.
analyzed: high pop is the only one to be positively and significantly associated with increases in all ethnic and educational categories.

Many further analyses could be pursued building on our theories and results. One is the political implications of different scenes, such as support for same-sex marriage. Another would be more contextual hypotheses: what happens when more exclusive amenities, such as yoga or golf courses, are situated in contexts saturated by more bridging ones, like martial arts, big box stores, or government offices? For example, although yoga studios tend to attract mostly higher-educated whites, those located near hierarchical, racially heterogeneous settings (e.g. some corporate and government offices) could be more likely to attract different races, as enthusiastic students invite their office colleagues to yoga class. By converting the weak bonds of the office into stronger bonds of communal body work, the yoga studio may contribute to interracial social capital.

Logan and Zhang, as we noted at the outset, have recently documented many types and forms of diversity in contemporary American neighborhoods. But we currently lack clear propositions about where and why some develop in one direction rather than another. Our results suggest that local organizational and cultural context may play crucial roles in these processes. Churches, karate clubs, yoga studios, music stores, sports bars — and the scenes they create — are like latter-day Weberian “switchmen” that help to guide residential development. They make places welcoming to some and alien to others; in some cases they encourage people and groups to reach out to diverse others, while in other cases they sediment existing divides and repel different groups from one another.

The broader concern of this paper is to the revitalization of civic democracy in the new century. Historically, mainline Christian churches and civic federations connected and mobilized Americans of diverse socioeconomic backgrounds (Skocpol 1999). Since the 1960s, however, significant numbers of the best-educated and the highest-income reject the historic religious and civic establishment (Skocpol 1999, Putnam & Campbell 2010, Hansen 2011). Even more worrisome is the steady withdrawal of lower socioeconomic groups, especially the less-educated and young, minority males, from organized religious and civic participation (e.g. Miller & Dixon-Roman 2011). These trends reinforce the current tendency of middle-class Americans to sort themselves by taste and politics and to withdraw from those with differing attitudes and sensibilities. Ironically, the most-educated, highest-income Americans are the least likely to experience political views different from their own (Mutz 2006: 31).

One central democratic task is the construction of shared, organized spaces, where different people develop the habits of talking, playing, and working together. We have developed a “many-stranded” theory of American democracy, which suggests that our modern, plural society nurtures and is nourished by many types of institutions, including more-authoritarian and outsider ones. New and transplanted practices supplement older, established ones and provide alternative venues of commitment and interaction. Contemporary American democracy includes but reaches beyond the New England town meeting. From the Marines to Mormons, from Aikido to Yoga, our many-stranded

32 In large, urban areas, martial arts attract many young, black males, who are decreasingly found in traditional black churches. They supplement, and even partner with, traditional churches to socially engage minority youth. In Chicago, martial arts tournaments are popular sites to connect minority youth with various socioeconomic groups, including white post-grads.
society potentially generates the creative tensions, divisions, and interactions that uniquely contribute to making democracy work. Understanding its potentials and challenges offers a promising research agenda for students of American democracy, scholars and citizens alike.

Works Cited


**Appendix**
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Main Control Variables

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for Main Dependent Variables
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<td><strong>Biblical-Christian</strong></td>
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<tr>
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Table 2: American Traditions in a Divided Society
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<td>2.6195</td>
<td>5.47379</td>
<td>2.998</td>
<td>14.202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: New Con and Low Pop are the most numerous and broadly distributed; Expressivist are the fewest and most concentrated.
### Table 4: New Con and New Age rarely mix; Pop Culture bridges many cultural divides

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New Con</th>
<th>Mainline</th>
<th>Baptist</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>New Age</th>
<th>Low Expressivist</th>
<th>Low Pop</th>
<th>High Pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Con</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Age</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Expressivist</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Pop</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Pop</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: this table shows partial correlations of our scenes with one another across roughly 42,000 zip codes, controlling for total Yellow Pages amenities in our database. Correlations significant at the .05 level are in bold; insignificant results are in italics.
Figure 1: More Main Line and Baptists are in the South and Midwest; More Expressivist and Martial Arts organizations are in the West and Northeast; Low Pop amenities are high in all regions, and New Con is weakest in the Northeast, strongest in the West.
Note: In this and figures 3-6, bars show the impact via the standardized regression coefficients for each independent variable (like New Con and Mainline here) on 21 dependent variables (e.g. 1990 % non-Hispanic Whites, etc.). Unless otherwise noted, variables included as controls are: total amenities, county population, zip code population, zip code density, median gross rent, % married, median age, % college graduates, county average school quality, % of the county that voted for Bill Clinton in 1992, and the other scene measures. Bars with an “o” above them indicate results not statistically significant at the .05 level.

Figure 2: New Con scenes are ethnically diverse, lower educated, and have many blacks and Hispanics.
Figure 3: New Age scenes are less and decreasingly diverse, more and increasingly white, more and increasingly educated.

Note: see note to figure 2.
Figure 4: Pop Culture scenes bridge many social divides and show positive sum dynamics.

Low Pop and High Pop/Martial Arts

Note: see note to Figure 2.
Figure 5: Martial Arts are more strongly associated with rising shares of African Americans and Hispanics in zip codes with moderate levels of African American residents than in predominantly Black or non-Black neighborhoods.

Note: Figure 5 shows the impact via the standardized regression coefficients of new age scenes on eleven dependent variables. The full model was repeated across three groups of non-Hispanic Black share of the total population: 0-1%, 1-8%, and 9-100%. See the note to Figure 2 for more details on the variables in the model.
Figure 6: In all white neighborhoods, New Age scenes have more hispanics, blacks, and Asians. In less white neighborhoods with more new age amenities, non-whites are declining and college graduates are rising.

Note: Figure 6 shows the impact via the standardized regression coefficients of new age scenes on eleven dependent variables. The full model was repeated across national quintiles of non-Hispanic white share of the total population. See the note to Figure 2 for more details on the variables in the model.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total County Population</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>County</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>42,7706</td>
<td>112,1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Zip Code Population</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8,579</td>
<td>12,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of pop. 15 years or older, married</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Gross Rent</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Quotient</td>
<td>Expansion Magazine</td>
<td>County</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of pop. 25 years or older with a Bachelors Or Higher</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Vote Share (Clinton)</td>
<td>Census</td>
<td>County</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>41.46</td>
<td>11.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Rate (per 100,000)</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>County</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3,707.72</td>
<td>2163.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Yellow Pages Amenities</td>
<td>Yellow Pages</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Entropy Index</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Non-hispanic white</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Hispanic</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Non-Hispanic Black</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Asian</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: this table shows the main control variables we include in our analyses. We applied natural logs if the item is highly skewed. All of the variables in the upper part of the table were used in all analyses; variables from the lower part of the table were included depending on the specific dependent variables being analyzed. We also included our scenes indexes in our models, analyzing each separately and controlling for the others. Components of the indexes are shown in Table 1; descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3. We experimented with multiple different specifications of our models and additional variables (such as change in employment, college graduates, % non-whites, and rents) and consistently found results substantively similar to those reported in the main text.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Level Of Analysis</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change in Population</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Percent College Graduates</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Total College Graduates</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Percent Grad/Professional Degrees</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Total Graduate Degree Holders</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Racial Entropy Index</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Percent Non-Hispanic White</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Total Non-Hispanic Whites</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>2975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Percent Hispanic</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Total Hispanics</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>1682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Percent Non-Hispanic Black</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Total Non-Hispanic Blacks</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>1128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Percent Asian</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Total Asians</td>
<td>Geolytics</td>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>1990/2000</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table shows the main change variables we analyzed as dependent variables. Descriptives for levels are in Table 5. Most of our change variables are measured as the difference between the proportion of the population in 2000 and the proportion of the population in 1990 for each category; sometimes natural logs are applied if the item is highly skewed. We applied several transformations to our measures of total change (in non-hispanic whites, etc.) but found that the simple raw change was most readily interpretable, though transformed variables yielded substantively similar results.